3
The article is divided into five sections. Section I explains the rationale for public provision of UI. Secti on II analyzes the structure of UI benefits and evaluates the relative generosity of those provided by the New England states. Section III exp lains how benefits are financed and compares UI tax burdens i n New England with those imposed by other states. Section IV explains how certain features of unemployment insurance taxation create cross-industry subsidies that affect resource allocation. Evidence is presented concerning the extent of such subsidization in Massachusetts.
Section V discusses the propose d UI tax reductions in Massachusetts and Vermont, as well as some alternative reforms.
I. Why Do Governments Provide Unemployment Insurance?
In an industrialized society, every worker, no matter how competent, faces the risk of becoming temporarily unemployed. This risk creates a demand for insurance that provides partial wage replacement between jobs. A market for such insurance will not form spontaneously because this risk is spread so unevenly. Workers in volatile industries, such as construction and the manufacture of automobiles, face a higher risk of being laid off than their counterparts in stable industries, such as public utilities and financial services. If unemployment insurance were voluntary, the latter group of workers would break away and form their ow n low-risk pool. As a result, workers with a severe risk of unemploy ment would face prohibitively high premiums. To ensure provision of UI, governments can either require high-risk employees to pay high premiums or arrange for their Private supplementary unemployment insurance is available. Workers may purchase--in a fashion similar to credit, 1 life and disability insurance on loans--unemployment insurance which guarantees periodic consumer loan payments during unemployment up to a certain duration. This option may represent a significant supplement in a consumer society where virtually everything from homes and cars to groceries and air travel may be purchased on credit. 4 premiums to be subsidized. The UI system of the United States, partially subsidizes the premiums covering high-risk workers through a payroll tax collected from employers. 1 If gov ernments financed unemployment compensation solely on a "pay as you go" basis, obligations for social assistance during recessions might become too heavy to bear. By compelling firms to contribut e regularly to a trust fund on behalf of their workers, governments are more likely to have the fiscal capacity to provide assistance to the unemployed when needed.
Forcing employers to pay UI taxes during "good" times so that benefits can be paid to the unemployed in "bad" times ("forward funding") stabilizes the economy by smoothing consumption.
As discussed in subsequent sections of this article, several features of UI are designed with stabilization in mind. Unemployment ins urance is considered a social obligation and an instrument of stabilization throughout the industrialized world. Virtually every economically developed nation currently provides such insurance to its workers.
II. Unemployment Insurance Benefits
The structure of UI benefits reflects principles of both insurance and social welfare. Under insurance, eligibility is denied to those who lack the ability or make insufficient effort to avoid the insured risk. Fo r example, a life insurer will not write a policy for someone in the terminal stages of a fatal illness; nor will a property insurer grant coverag e to a landlord whose buildings are continually burning down because of faulty electrical wiring. Furthermore, the compensation offered to
The base p eriod is usually four recent calendar quarters. (In Massachusetts, it is the four most recent quarters.) 2 In man y cases the minimum earning requirement implies a minimum work requirement as well. For example, accordi ng to one eligibility requirement in Massachusetts, an unemployed worker must have earned an amount during the base perio d equal to at least 30 times the weekly UI benefit amount (WBA) for which he or she would otherwise qualify. A worker's WBA generally equals one-half of his or her average weekly base period wage. Hence, the earning requirement implies a minimum work requirement of 15 weeks (30 x ½).
5 individuals incurring the insured risk reflects premiums paid. By contrast, eligibility and benefit levels in social welfare programs depend on recipients' presumed need.
Characteristics of UI Benefits Reflecting Insurance Principles
Consistent with the principles of insurance, UI programs limit eligibility to workers who have demonstrated some attachment to the wor k force. As a result, former employers would already have contribut ed at least a modest amount to the state's UI trust fund. Such rules are also designed to prohibit an employee from working for a few da ys, becoming "unemployed" through an arrangement with his employer, and then collecting benefits. In general, to become insured as of a given date, a worker must meet the following requirements, among others:
1) The worker must have earned a minimum amount an d, in some states, worked a minimum number of weeks during a "base" period. 2) The worker must have been working for employers who have employed at least one worker and/or met a stipulated minimum payroll for a minimum period of time.
3) The worker must have become unemployed involuntarily and through no fault of his or her own.
4) The worker must be capable of, available for, and actively seeking work and must not refuse suitable employment if offered.
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Limitations on the duration of benefits are also designed to det er workers and employers from creating and perpetuating unemployment. The maximum period during which an unemployed worker can receive benefits in a 52-week period is 30 weeks in Massachusetts (Table 1) strikes a balance between work disincentive (an insurance concern) and benefit generosity (a social welfare concern). Since UI is financed almost entirely by payro ll taxes on employers (see Section III), varying benefits with i ncome also strengthens the link between benefits earned and UI contributions made.
States set maximum WBAs in part to encourage return to work and to limit assistance to levels needed only for the purchase of necessities. However, benefit limits also enhance states' capacity to spread assistance as widely as possible. The lower the maximum, the narrower the range of incomes for which one-half replacement is achieved bu t, other things equal, the wider the potential coverage.
What m aximum WBA limit strikes the optimal balance between these conflicting concerns?
Several U.S . Presidents and UI advisory councils have advocated that states achieve one-half wage replacement for at least 80 percent of their covered workers (Becker 1980; O'Leary 1996 In a for thcoming article, the authors will report on more sophisticated simulations based on current law, involving mul ti year analysis, and permitting interstate comparisons of tax burdens for representative employers. Also, see footnote 10.
The states of Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania also collect employee contributions.
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The federal government imposes additional taxes on employers whose states have borrowed from the federal UI 6 trust fund. Int erest payments on federal loans cannot be paid out of trust fund balances. Federal rules require that such payments be financed by UI surtaxes or general revenues. 9 10, those for this hypothetical worker are generally higher and the dispersion narrower. Connecticut's and New Hampshire's replacement ratios are much higher.
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III. How Unemployment Insurance is Financed
Unem ployment insurance is financed almost entirely by payroll taxes levied on employers.
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These taxes have both federal and state components. The federal component is nominally 6.2 percent of the first $7,000 of the wages of covered employees. However, the federal government grants a credit to employers aga inst all but 0.8 percentage point of the tax, provided that they pay their state taxes in a timely manner and their state's unemployment compensation program adheres to federal guidelines. Since the programs of all states have been approved by the federal government, the federal tax is in effect 0.8 percent of the first $7,000 of wages, or $56 per covered worker.
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With the proceeds of this tax, the federal government pays for administration of the program (at both the federal and s tate levels), assumes partial responsibility for the cost of extended benefits, and maintains a federal unemployment trust fund from which a state may borrow should it exhaust its own trust fund. Revenues from state UI taxes finance the regular benefit payments, by far the Except in the three states in which an employee tax is also imposed.
7 10 largest proportion of total UI costs. Since any federal loans to states must eventually be repaid with interest, each state's UI system is essentially self-financed by its employers.
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The characteristics of state UI taxes vary widely within broad federal parameters. The base of the stat e tax must be no lower than the federal base (the first $7,000 of wages paid to an employee). Many states have a higher base; in New England, bases range from $7,000 in Maine to $17,600 in Rhode Island, the third highest in the nation (Table 2 ).
State UI Tax Rates: The Experience Rating Principle Every state's UI tax structure is based on the experience rating principle. This principle requires that an employer's tax rat e vary positively with its propensity to lay off workers. Thus, each employer is subject to a different rate, reflecting the degree to which it s former employees have drawn UI benefits.
Experience rating in effect divides the employers of the insured population into separate risk pools. Wo rkers employed by firms in each pool face a different risk of incurring involuntary unemployment; the higher the risk, the higher the tax rate faced by the empl oyer. Such a rate structure promotes allocative efficiency by imposing a price on each employer reflecting the social costs of the unemployment that the employer gener ates. Experience rating induces employers to take these costs into account in decisions concerning technology, pricing, v olume, and product mix. When these costs are not fully internalized, volatile industries, that is, those with per sistently high layoff rates, command an inefficiently large proportion of economic resources.
The computation period, which varies from state to state, is usually three years prior to the computation date.
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Whether ex perience rating promotes economic stabilization is less clear. While it may discourage layoffs, it may increase t he incidence of bankruptcy during recessions by requiring higher tax payments from firms when they can least afford them. As will be discus sed in Section IV, a variety of modifications to a pure experience-rated system can mitigate this deleterious effect.
How the experience rating principle is implemented. While states have great latitude in designing experience rating schemes, each uses one of two approaches: "reserve ratio" or "benefit ratio." Within New England, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island use the reserve ratio approach, while Connecticut and Vermont use the benefit ratio approach (Table 2) .
Under the reserve ratio approach, a state government keeps track of each firm's cumulative tax payments to the state trust fund (since the fi rm's inception) and the cumulative benefits "charged"
to the firm (p aid to workers that it has laid off). As of some "computation date" the government determine s the firm's "reserve"--the difference between its cumulative contributions and benefit charges. This reserve is then divided by the employer's average annual taxable or total payroll during a stipulated "computation period" to arri ve at the firm's "reserve ratio." The lower the firm's reserve 8 ratio, the higher its tax rate.
Under the benefit ratio approach, an employer's a ccount reflects only the history of its benefit charges and payroll. For a given computation period (usually three years ending shortly before the beginning of the taxable year), the government aggregates the firm's benefit charges and divides by its taxable or total payroll. The higher the resulting "benefit ratio," the higher the firm's tax rate.
The reserve ratio approach embodi es the concept of "precautionary" balances. Each firm has an account th at builds a surplus of contributions over benefit charges during periods of economic Tax ra tes respond gradually because experience ratings are based on cumulative contributions relative to benefits. Thus, the "weight" of each firm's prior history creates an inertia in experience ratings with respect to changes in the incidence of layoffs. 12 expansion, which is then drawn down during recessions or periods of seasonal layoffs. After a surge in benefit payouts, a firm's tax liability rises gradually, but then remains at a higher level for a long period of time and falls slowly in response to improving conditions. By contrast, the benefit ratio 9 method is closer to a "pay as you go" appr oach in which payments for benefit charges are made with a lag. A s urge in benefits is paid for relatively rapidly; then, payments fall steeply once the benefit charges have be en "paid off" (Figure 1 ). Thus, other things equal, a UI tax system based on the reserve ratio approach is less procyclical than the benefit ratio approach.
Are New England's UI Tax Burdens Relatively High?
As in interstate comparis ons of benefit levels, one should control for economic conditions in interstate comparisons of UI tax burdens. Given the experience rating principle, employers' tax burdens rise in res ponse to an increase in unemployment rates. In a national recession, employers in states enduring an especially severe contraction usually experience a rise in their UI tax burden relative to employers in less affected states. The opposite occurs when their state enjoys unusually rapid economic growth. Therefore, it is desirable to compare states' UI tax burdens averaged over several years encompassing a variety of economic conditions. volatile industries have relatively high UI costs and tax burdens. Interstate comparisons of tax burdens and benefit levels that take both economic conditions and industry mix into account will be presented by the authors in a subsequent article. (Also, see footnote 4.)
How much a state's relative UI tax burden affects its overall economic competitiveness is controversial because economists disagree on who actually bears the burden of UI taxes. According to recent studies, much of their burden is borne in the long run by workers rather than employers in the form of lower compensation. However, in the inter mediate run much of the burden of these taxes probably falls on employers, thereby increasing their cost of doing b usiness. Furthermore, because an employer's UI tax burden varies with economic conditions and is therefore difficult to predict, it is arguably an especially sensitive issue for employers considering a state as a potential location for a new facility.
Indeed a perfectly experience-rated system could not function because firms with a high propensity to lay off 11 workers would face prohibitvely high tax burdens. 13 highest in the nation; Maine's, Massachusetts', and Vermont's were above the national median;
Connecticut's was slightly below the median, while New Hampshire's was lower than that of every other state except South Dakota.
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IV. Cross-Industry Subsidies and Departures from Experience Rating
No stat e's UI tax system adheres unswervingly to the experience-rating principle.
Firms 11 generating the largest benefit outlays pay a disproportionately small share of contributions into the system. Such firms are partially subsidized by others. Firm s enjoying the largest subsidies tend to face highly cyclical or seas onal demand for their products. The main features of UI financing responsible for suc h subsidization are maximum and minimum tax rates, time lags, exclusions, and solvency measures.
Maximum and Minimum Tax Rates
All states constrain the range of employer tax rates. At some point, a firm's tax rate stops rising no matter how much its experience rating "worsens" and stops falling no matter how much its
According to simula tions performed by Hunt and O'Leary (1989) , changes in layoff rates affect reserve percentages as 12 many as 15 years into the future.
14 experience rating "improves." For example, Massachusetts currently imposes a maximum tax rate of 8.1 percent o n all firms with a reserve ratio of -14 percent of taxable payroll or less and a minimum rate of 2.2 percent on firms with a positive reserve ratio of 14.5 percent or higher (schedule D in Figure 2 ). A firm whose reserve ratio is -0.20 percent is subject to the same tax rate as one with a reserve ra tio of -14 percent, even though the former has imposed greater net costs on its state's UI system. At the same time, a firm with a positive reserve ratio of 20 percent must pay a 2.2 percent rate of tax, the same as a firm with a ratio of only 14.5 percent.
Under the reserve ratio approach, a firm in the maximum tax b racket might ultimately become liable for all benefits paid to its laid-off workers if its employment eventually stabilizes. This would be so b ecause the reserve ratio reflects a firm's propensity to lay off workers many years into the past. Consequently , a high historical layoff rate would slow adjustment to lower tax brackets after 12 the incidence of layoffs falls. Similarly, the high level of reserves bui lt up by firms paying the minimum tax rate, despite few layoffs, would slow the increase in tax rates if their propensity to separate workers rose. However, Massachusetts diminishes the potential for such long-run accounting adjustme nts by constraining the range of possible reserve ratios to between -25 percent and 50 percent. The effect of such constraints is illustrated in the accompanying box.
States using the benefit ratio approach, such as Connecticut and Vermont, are less likely to recoup the cost of benefits charged to firms with co nsistently high layoff rates. Consider the situation of firms at the maximum tax rate for more t han three consecutive years. Since under the benefit ratio approach an employer's experience rating generally reflects its behavior only during the three
The Advisory Council (1995, p. 81) estimated the percentage of total benefit charges that were "ineffectively 13 charged" in 1 993. It defined ineffectively charged benefits as those that neither draw on accumulated past taxes nor trigger additional current taxes because they are paid to former workers of employers who are at the maximum tax rate. Th e percentages for the New England states were: Connecticut, 37.3; Maine, 25.5; Massachusetts, 19.9; New Hampshire, 20.6; Rhode Island, 19.3; and Vermont, 21.5 . The national median was 18.4. 15 previous years, these firms will never become liable for some of their previous benefit charges. By similar reasoning, a firm with stable employment for mo re than three years does not get full credit for its "g ood" behavior should subsequent economic adversity propel it into a tax bracket above the minimum.
How imp ortant are firms clustered at minimum and maximum employer tax rates to the economies of the New England states? How does clustering at these extremes d iffer across industries? Figure 3 shows, for all Mass achusetts employers and for selected industries, the percentage of total payroll accounted for by employers at the maximu m and minimum tax rates in 1995. In all industries, firms accounting for about 5 percent of payroll were clustered in each extreme tax bracket. At the end of a recession, the share of all firms at the maximum rate would be higher. in Figure 2 ), is 8.1 percent.
Over the next year, the firm's fortunes improve dramatically. It contributes $20 million in UI taxes and no benefits are charged to its account. Its payroll during its computation period
In the cases of public utilities, banking, insurance, and personal services, the high concentration of payroll at 14 the minimum is primarily a reflection of these industries' inherent stability. In the case of eating and drinking places, a season al industry with a relatively high turnover rate, a number of factors could be responsible. Perhaps a relatively low percentage of e mployees who get laid off are eligible for UI. Because the industry is labor intensive and has a high rate of labo r turnover, UI is potentially high relative to total payroll for owners of eating and drinking establishments.
As a result, they m ay manage their UI accounts very carefully. Finally, the low wages paid to workers in the industry--and, therefore, the industry's high ratio of taxable wa ges to total payroll--may boost taxes paid as a percentage of total wages and therefore employers' experience ratios. Clustering p atterns differed sharply across industries, however. In construction, firms at the maximum tax rate accounted for 37 percent of total payroll. A similarly skewed distribution was exhibited in agricul ture and in mining. Slightly above-average clustering at the maximum was found in the manufacture of electrical machinery (SIC 36), the 2-digit manufacturing industry with the largest emp loyment in the Commonwealth. These findings are not surprising, given the inherent volatility and seasonality of agriculture, mining, and construction, and t he structural "downsizing" that the Commonwealth's manufacturers of electrical machinery have experienced over the past several years.
By contrast , almost one-quarter of the payroll in public utilities was paid out by firms at the minimum tax rate. Payroll was also concentrated heavily at the m inimum in banking, insurance, eating and drinking places, and personal services.
14 As shown in Figure 4 , the average employer tax burden in Vermont has borne little relation to benefit payout 15 rates in recent years. The reasons for this unusual pattern are explained later in this section in the text and in the accompanying box.
Lags also weaken the deterrent to laying off workers inherent in pure experience rating. In New England, an employer's tax rate for a given year is based on its experience rating computed between three and six months before the date the rate takes effect. Furthermore, an employer's experience rating typically reflects its actual behavior over several years preceding this computation date. In Connecticut, for example, an employer's tax rate for 1996 depends on its benefit ratio computed as of June 30, 1995. This ratio, in turn, is based on the total benefits charged to its account as a percentage of its total payroll during 1992, 1993, and 1994.
The lagged response of tax burdens to benefit payout rates in New England can be seen in Figure 4 . In effect, these lags represent interest-free "loans." Like maximum tax rates, they serve 15 the useful counter cycli cal function of protecting firms in all industries from a sharp increase in their UI tax liability at a time when they usually can least afford it. Nevertheless, firms in highly cyclical industries or firms that utilize seasonal workers extensively benefit disproportionately from these loans. Consequently, time lags exacerbate the allocative distortions created by the UI system. New H ampshire such measures are imposed at the discretion of the commissioner of unemployment insurance whenev er he or she deems the solvency of the state's trust fund to be in jeopardy. In Connecticut and Massachusetts, whether such mea sures are undertaken depends on the ratio of the trust fund balance to total wages of covered employee s. Rhode Island's statutes stipulate the determining factor as the ratio of the trust fund balance to total taxable wages of cov ered employees. In Maine and Vermont, the adequacy of the trust fund balance in effect is judged by the number o f months of benefits that the surplus could finance. In evaluating the number of months in reserve, Maine assumes the ann ual benefit payout rate (benefits as a percentage of total wages) averaged over the previous 15 years. Vermont a ssumes the highest annual benefit payout rate during the previous 10 years, a more stringent criterion that in recent years has created a large trust fund surplus (see the box, below).
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"socialized," or spread uniformly among all employers, partly on the theory that society as a whole has a moral obligation to provide for the children of laid-off workers.
Solvency Measures
Ideally, "forward funded" UI trust funds should remain solvent even during periods of severe economic contraction. UI taxes collected during periods of economic recovery and expansion should be sufficient to fund UI benefits during rece ssions. In fact, the trust fund of every New England state except New Hampshire has been entire ly depleted at some point during the last 25 years, forcing the state to borrow from the federal government ( Figure 5 ). Even New Hampshire has experienced years in which the balance in its trust fund has been uncomfortably low. As noted in the introduction, the need to borrow from the federal trust fund has not been limited to New England.
In order to rebuild depleted trust fund reserves quickly and to reduce the need for future borrowing, states automatically impose tax increases when their reserves fall below a certain threshold. Because of the manner in which these supplementary taxes are generally structured, they 17 indirectly affect the degree to whic h UI systems promote allocative efficiency. Within New England, many of these measures raise each employer's tax rate by a constant percentage-point amount.
The laws of Connecticut and New Hampshire provide for only one rate schedule but give the state the authority 18 to raise the tax rate in each bracket by a uniform percentage-point amount to maintain an adequate trust fund balance. Such tax increases are tantamount to parallel upward rate shifts.
Rate sch edules provided for by the laws of Maine depart further from the experience rating principle than those 19 in Mass achusetts. As the rate schedule is shifted upward, the percentage-point rate increase is significantly larger for the best-rated firms than the worst-rated firms. Under the lightest schedule, rates range from 0.5 percent to 6.4 percent; under the heaviest schedule, rates range from 2.8 percent to 7.5 percent. Thus, in moving from the lowest to the highest schedule, firms at the minimum tax rate experience a rate increase of 1.9 percentage points, while the comparable increase for firms at the maximum tax rate is only 1.1 percent. In Vermont and Rhode Island, however, each upward shift produces a percentage-point rate increase that is inversely related to the quality of the employer's experience rating. example, the laws of Massachusetts provide for eight altern ative schedules (Figure 2 ). When the trust fund balance as a percentage of total wages paid to covered emplo yees is 3 percent or more, schedule AA is in effect. When this percentage is below 0.8 percent, the heaviest schedule, schedule G, is imposed. As the schedule becomes heavier, the tax rate in each experience-rating bracket increases by 0.4 per centage point. Consequently, firms having laid off no workers experience the same percentage-point increase in tax rate as those firms having laid of f a large fraction of their work force, a violation of the experience rating principle.
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In recent years, both Connecticut and New Hamp shire have introduced modifications to their solvency measures that conform more closely with t he experience rating principle. In the first quarter of 1996, New Hampshire, enjoying a healthy surplus in its trust fund, awarded all employers with a
The New Hampshire Commissioner of Employment Security has the authority to subtract, on a quarterly basis, 20 0.5 percentage po int from the tax rates applicable to employers with a positive reserve ratio whenever the balance in the state' s unemployment trust fund equals or exceeds $200 million (currently about 14 percent of statewide covered payroll). Further successive across-the-board reductions of 0.5 percentage point are authorized when the balance equals or e xceeds $225 million and $250 million. Notwithstanding these reductions, an absolute minimum tax rate of 0.01 percent is required ( New Hampshire Laws , 282-A:82).
Connecticut a lso floated bonds to pay off its federal debt immediately in order to reduce interest costs that 21 ultimately woul d have had to be passed on to employers. The interest rate charged by the federal government would have exceeded 7 percent; the average interest rate on the bonds was 4.1 percent.
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positive reserve ratio (contributions exceeding benefit payouts) a 1-percentage-point reduction in their tax rates. No such reduction was granted to firms with a negative ratio.
In 1993, Connecticut floated bonds to eliminate a persistent trust fund deficit and to repay federal loans. In order to pay off these bonds, the state levied a dedicated assessment on each employer; the assessment's value as a percentage of the employer's payroll varied directly with the firm's propensity to lay off workers. Had Connecticut not paid off its federal debt in this manner, the uniform federal unem ployment tax rate imposed on the state's employers would have risen from 0.8 percent to 1.7 percent and kept increasing by 0.3 percentage point per year until the debt had been paid off. These federal tax increases would have come on top of the state's solvency assessment, currently a flat 1.5 percent of all taxable payrolls.
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Estimates of the Degree of Cross-Industry Subsidization, by State: The Experience Rating Index
The extent of cross-industry subsidiza tion varies roughly with the degree of adherence to the experience rating principle. A c rude indicator of the degree to which a state adheres to this principle is the "Experience Rating Index" (ER I), published annually for each state by the U.S. Department of Labor. The index equals the percentage of total unemployment b enefits paid by a state that is charged to specific employers for the purpose of experie nce rating. The lower the index value, the greater the
The unpaid UI tax liability of a failed employer is assumed by the state system as a whole. through 1995 is presented in Figure 6 .
In every state except Vermont, the ERI was lower in the recession years of 1990 to 1992 than in preceding or following years, a pattern found throughout the nation. During recessions, the concentration of firms at t he maximum tax rate becomes greater and the business failure rate rises.
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States must finance the sur ge in benefit payouts by running down their trust fund surplus until firms' experience ratings respond, with a lag. As a result, automatic upward shifts in rate schedules and other solvency measures are more likely to be triggered. absolute one. As its experience rating deteriorates, its tax rate, absent a schedule shift, will not rise if other employers' experience ratings deteriorate at the same rate. Its tax rate will rise only if its experience rating has deteriorated relatively rapidly.
Under such a rule, one m ight reasonably question Vermont's ability to maintain the solvency of its trust fund other than in years of extremely low unemployment. In fact, during the past eight years Vermont's trust fund has consistently been one of the best reserved in the country. This apparent paradox can be explained by the state's strict solvency standards, which have kept high tax rate schedules in effect for many years, even during periods of robust economic growth (see the box).
As a result of these str ict standards, by 1990 Vermont's trust fund balance as a percentage of wages paid to covered employees was the largest in the nation. The s tate financed rising benefit payout rates during the most recent recession mostly by drawing down part of this large surplus rather than by Estimates were made for three periods: 1988 to 1992, 1993 to 1996, and 1988 to 1996 . The measure used (developed by Munts and Asher 1980) was net subsidy a s a fraction of wages (SUBRATE). For any given period, SUBRATE is equal to:
where:
3BENEFIT S = the total dollar amount of benefits paid to employers in industry x during the period 3CONTRIBUTIONS = the total dollar amount of contributions made by employers in industry x during the period 3TOTAL WAGES = the total dollar amount of wages paid by employers in industry x to covered employees during the period.
Results are presented in Table 4 . SUBRATE was positive for Massachusetts' employers as a whole for the years 1988 to 1992, a period during which the Commonwealth had to borrow from the federal UI trust fund. With the recovery, the Commonwealth paid of f its debt and began to rebuild its own trust fund. As a result, SUBRATE was negative between 1993 and 1996.
Given the pattern of clustering at minimum and maximum tax rates exhibited in Figure 3 , it is not surprising that construction is the sector of the Massachusett s economy most heavily subsidized by the Com monwealth's UI system. For the entire 1988-96 period, construction firms drew a net subsidy of over $25 per $1,000 of payroll, while employers as a whole were making a net contribution of $1.40 per $1,000. Over the nine-year pe riod, the construction sector received 22 percent of all UI benefits and m ade only 9 percent of all contributions, while accounting for 5 percent of total wages paid to covered employees.
Construction received such a disproportionately large share of UI benefits during this period not only because of its inherent cyclical sensitivity and seasonality but also because Massachusetts' real estate mar kets were unusually volatile. Between 1982 and 1987, the inflation-adjusted value of contracts awarded for residential construction within the Commonwealth almost quadrupled, while those for nonresidential con struction expanded by 75 percent. As a result, construction employment rose by over 80 percent from 1982 to 1988. In the ensuing "bust," this sector lost all of these job gains and more ( Figure 7 ). More than one in every six Massachusetts employees who lost their jobs during the last recession were construction workers. While it has grown steadily in recent years, construction employment is still well below its previous peak.
Manufacturing was the only other major sector to have been subsidized, although its net subsidy, 20 cents per $1,000 of payroll, was very small. The sector accounted for 28 percent of all benefits, 25 percent of contributions, and 29 percent of all payroll. Among 2-digit industries accounting for at least 2 percent of total wages paid out sin ce 1988, the most heavily subsidized were special trade contractors, the manufacture of transportation equipment, and the manufacture of Specifically, after three years of a temporary freeze on UI rates at schedule D, rates are scheduled to rise to 24 schedule E. The proposal would lower rates to schedule C (see Figure 2 ). Rates were also temporarily reduced in 1992. Proponents of permanent rate reductions argue that they would enhance their state's economi c competitiveness. Competitiveness is less of a consideration in temporary rate cuts since rates usuall y return to their previous level after the cuts expire, precluding long-terms reductions in employer costs. Advocates of temporary cuts generally argue either that the level of their state's trust fund is adequate (even if relatively low) or that reserves will become adequate within a few years.
Since the economic outlook is so sanguine, both in New England and rest of the nation, they see an acceptable risk in s lowing the rate of reserve accumulation and value in allowing employers to keep some dollars othe rwise earmarked for UI contributions. Moreover, they reason that, should current economic forecasts prove too optimistic and trust fund reserves are exhausted during the next recession, states will still have the option of borrowing from the federal government to benefit pay benefit obligations.
A central issue in the debate over both temporary and permanent rate cuts, therefore, is what constitutes an adequate level of reserves. T he most frequently used standard is the high cost multiple In the past, the U.S. Labor Department has endorsed an HCM of 1.5 as a solvency guideline (Advisory Council, 1995 ) . In effect the standard requires trust fund reserves sufficient to finance 18 months of benefits paid out at the highest cost rate that the state has ever experienced. In 1996Q4, only Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah exceeded this extremely conservative standard, although Verm ont came close at 1.43. The five other New England states fell far short (Table 5, column 1).
As the Advisory Council discussed in its report to the President and Congress (1995), the 1.5
HCM may be too strict. The most serious re cession in a state's history since the inception of UI may 27 have been produced by a unique confluence of factors that is highly unlikely to be repeated.
Consequently, the Council recommended an alternative, less stringent standa rd that takes into account UI experience over a shorter historical period. Specifically, each state should accumulate reserves sufficient to provide at least one year of benefits paid out at the a verage of the three highest cost rates recorded during the past 20 years. The Advisory Council also offered a variety of alternative standards.
The de gree to which each New England state had achieved these various standards as of 1996Q4 is summarized in Table 5 , columns 2 through 7. Among all the state, more than one-half had met at least one these standards, and almost two-thirds had met the standard recommended by the Advisory Council (column 4). Within New England, Ne w Hampshire and Vermont both substantially exceeded all six standards. By co ntrast, the reserves of the other four New England states were well below every guideline.
Nevertheless, with the economy performing so well, some of these four states have a reasonable chance of achieving at least one of these standards within a few years. Official 1997 projections of the Massachusetts Departmen t of Employment and Training provide evidence that the Commonwealth may be one of these stat es, even with a rate cut. According to these projections, the Commonwealth's UI tax rate jumps by 0.8 percentage point across-the-board in 1998 (from schedule C to schedule E in Figure 2 ), after the propo sed temporary rate cut expires. By the end of 1998 trust fund balances exceed the adequacy standards presented in columns 6 and 7 of Table 5 . By the end of 19 99, reserves also exceed the standard presented in column 3 and the standard preferred by Advisory Council (column 4). In addition, reserves come within 1 percent of attaining the standards 28 presented in columns 2 and 5. These projections assume that through the end of 1999 the state's annual unemployment rate averages about 4.0 percent.
Two important issues that should be considered in evalu ating a one-year rate cut for 1997 are the probability that its expiration date will be extended and that a recession will begin before trust funds accumulate adequate reserves. Oppon ents of temporary tax cuts note that the lifetimes of such cuts are often extended. For example, Massachuse tts has extended freezes on its UI rate schedule (at schedule D) every year since 1993. Furthermore, noting t hat the current recovery has been long-lived by postwar standards, opponents believe that the risk of a recession sometime within three years is substantial. They therefore fear that states implementing rate reductions run an unacceptable risk of exhausting their trust fund reserves during the next recession, incurring costly federal debt, and possibly co nfronting the need to curtail benefits. They also caution that, if the availability of federal loans induces many states to relax efforts to accumulate res erves, the federal government might make credit more ex pensive or reduce the interest payments that it pays to states on their reserves if their trust fund bal ance is small. Finally, they argue that if states forego rate cuts now and current optimistic eco nomic forecasts prove accurate, growth in reserves will permit rates to drop later. As a result, within a few years, rates are likely to be the same with or without short-term UI tax relief.
The projections of the Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training support this argument.
Largely absent from the debate over proposed rate cuts in both Massachusetts and Vermont has been any discussion of the impact of shifts in r ate schedules on allocative efficiency. As explained in Secti on IV, uniform upward shifts in statutory rates violate the experience rating principle and therefore accentuate allocative distortions. Uniform downward shifts have the opposite effect.
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However, if slowing reserve accu mulation ultimately sacrificed adequacy, it might necessitate future uniform upward shifts in rat es to restore solvency. In this manner, UI cuts implemented today could indirectly aggravate allocative distortions over the long run.
Whatever reserve level or tax schedule Massachusetts and other states deem optimal for now, they might wish to consider more permanent reforms of their UI tax structure that would enhance allocative efficiency by reducing cross-industry subsidization. Examples of such measures include the following:
!Reducing minimum tax rates and raising maximum tax rates. Rhode Island, which is currently considering this option, has 9 different UI tax rate schedules. Each schedule has 20 different rates tha t differ by 0.1 percentage point. As in other states, which schedule is effective in any given year depends on the level of reserves in th e state's UI trust fund. In each schedule, the minimum rate is applicable t o employers with a reserve ratio equal to or greater than 15.5 percent, while the maximum rat e applies to those with a ratio equal to or less than -16 percent. A bill currently before the state's legislature would add a bracket to the bottom and four brackets to the top of each rate schedule. As a result, the minimum tax rate in each schedule would fall by between 0.2 and 0.4 percentage point and would apply to employers with a reserve ratio equal to or greater than 17 percent. The maximum rate i n each schedule would rise by 1.6 percentage point and would apply to employers with a reserve ratio equal to or less than -24 percent.
!Reducing time lags in the determination of an employer's tax rate for a given year. As noted in section IV, an employer's tax rate for a given year is usually determined on the basis of its experience rat ing calculated three to six months before the year begins. Given modern computation technology, a lag of less than six months is achievable.
These suggestions, among others, have been made by Brechling and Laurence (1995 Figure 2 ).
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In addition to promotin g allocative neutrality, these reforms would permit UI tax reductions for many relatively stable industries, and give firms in more volatile industries a stronger incentive to reduce labor turnover. On the negat ive side, these measures would impose additional fiscal stress on employers with shrinking payrolls and little cash flow. During a recession, when layoffs and cash flow problems are widespread, the subsidies built into the UI system provide a cushion to severely stressed firms across all industries, thereby dimin ishing the incidence of bankruptcy. Reducing these subsidies would weaken this stabilizing influence. (1) Benefits charged in the 3 preceding years divided by taxable payrolls totaled over the 3 preceding years. Computed as of June 30; effective January 1.
(2) Net contributions as of the prior July 31 divided by average annual payroll in the 3 preceding years. Calculated as of June 30. Effective January 1.
(3) Net reserves as of September 30 in the preceding year divided by taxable payroll for the preceding year. Effective January 1.
(4) Net reserve balance as of January 31 divided by average annual taxable payrolls over the prior 3 years. Effective July 1.
(5) Net reserves as of June 30 divided by average annual taxable payroll over the prior 3 years. Effective January 1.
(6) Ratio of total benefits charged to total payrolls over the 3 preceding years, as of the preceding December 31. Effective July 1.
Source: Commerce Clearing House, Unemployment Insurance Reports . 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 
